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Abstract
In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a
monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality
supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a
high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.
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1 Introduction
We analyze the behavior of a monopolistic retailer that may enter into a contractual
relationship with two upstream producers supplying goods of different quality. Unlike
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the existing literature, we assume that all firms retain bargaining power in the setting
of the supply contract. We show that the monopolist always signs contracts with both
firms. Although the equilibrium contracts are efficient (upstream price equals upstream
marginal production cost), the monopolist sets downstream prices so as to always sell
the high-quality variant of the good only. It nevertheless pays a fixed fee to the low-
quality producer in order to improve its outside option and hence its bargaining position
relative to the high-quality supplier. In the following, Section 2 presents the model and
Section 3 identifies and characterizes its unique equilibrium. Finally, Section 4 positions
our paper relative to the extant literature.
2 The model
Two upstream firms, denoted 1 and 2, produce a vertically differentiated good of quality
s1 and s2 respectively, with s2 > s1 > 0. A downstream monopolist purchases the
good(s) from one (or both) firm(s) and sells it (them) to the final consumers. Both the
production and retail costs are zero.
Consumers are heterogeneous in their quality appreciation θ, which is uniformly
distributed with density 1
θ−θ over [0, 1]. A consumer enjoys an indirect Mussa and Rosen
(1978) utility U(θ) = θsi − pi if she buys a product of quality si at price pi, and zero if
she abstains from consuming, i ∈ {1, 2}. As a unit mass of consumers exists, the market
demands are written D1(p1, p2) =
1
θ−θ
(
p2−p1
s2−s1 −
p1
s1
)
and D2(p1, p2) =
1
θ−θ
(
1− p2−p1
s2−s1
)
when both goods are supplied; and Di(pi) =
1
θ−θ
(
1− pi
si
)
when variant i only is offered.
Consider a three-stage game. At stage 1 the downstream monopolist commits to an
exclusive relationship with firm i ∈ {1, 2} only, or to a non-exclusive relationship with
both firms. At stage 2 the monopolist bargains simultaneously with each of its suppliers
over a two-part-tariff contract (wi, ti), where wi is a per-unit input price and ti is the
fixed fee. At stage 3, the monopolist sets the final price(s) for the goods purchased.
We solve by backward induction the sub-games with an exclusive contract and that
with non-exclusive ones, and compare their outcomes to find the subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium of the whole game.
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3 Equilibrium
3.1 Exclusive contracts
Stage 3. The monopolist commits to an exclusive relationship with producer i ∈
{1, 2}. The pricing stage profit for the monopolist is (pi − wi)Di(pi) − ti, which is
maximized for pi(wi) =
si+wi
2
. By plugging the price back into the profit we find that
this profit is Πi(wi, ti) =
(si−wi)2
4si
− ti. The profit of supplier i is wiDi(pi) + ti, which, at
pi(wi), writes pii(wi, ti) =
(si−wi)wi
2si
+ ti.
Stage 2. The optimal two-part tariff (wi, ti) is obtained through the generalized Nash
bargaining solution. Let α ∈]0, 1[ (res. β ∈]0, 1[) be the power of the monopolist in the
bargaining with the high-(res. low-)quality producer, and, accordingly, let 1 − α and
1 − β be the power of the high- and low-quality producers respectively.1 The outside
options for all the firms are zero: if no agreement is reached, no firm has alternative
sources of profit. The Nash product is, therefore, B(wi, ti) = [Π(wi, ti)]
µ[pi(wi, ti)]
1−µ,
with i = 1, 2 and µ = α (res. µ = β) if, and only if i = 2 (res. i = 1). Maximization
of Bi(wi, ti) with respect to wi and ti gives wi = 0 and ti =
(1−µ)si
4
. The variable part
of the tariff is set so as to maximize the joint profits of the chain, and the total profits
are apportioned according to the sharing rule determined by the bargaining weights.
By plugging the optimal two-part tariff back into price, demand and profits we obtain
their values at the equilibrium of these sub-games:
pIi =
si
2
, DIi =
1
2
, (1)
ΠIi = µ
si
4
, piIi = (1− µ)
si
4
; (2)
with i = 1, 2 and µ = α (res. µ = β) if, and only if i = 2 (res. i = 1). If committed to an
exclusive relationship, the monopolist signs a contract with the high-(res. low-)quality
producer if, and only if ΠI2 > Π
I
1 ⇔ αβ > s1s2 (res. ΠI2 < ΠI1 ⇔ αβ < s1s2 ).
1We let α and β vary over the open interval ]0, 1[ to allow for a positive bargaining power for all
the firms.
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3.2 Non-exclusive contracts
Stage 3. The monopolist may sign a contract with both producers and, thus, sell
both goods to the final consumers. In this case its profits are written as
2∑
i=1
[(pi − wi)Di(p1, p2)− ti]. (3)
Standard computations yield the optimal prices at this stage: pi(wi, ti) =
si+wi
2
, for
i = 1, 2. Accordingly, the profits for the monopolist, the high-quality producer and
the low-quality producer are Π(w1, w2, t1, t2) =
s1[∆s(s2−2w2)+w22]+w1(s2w1−2s1w2)
4s1∆s
− t1− t2,
pi2(w1, w2, t2) =
w2(∆s−w2+w1)
2∆s
+ t2 and pi1(w1, w2, t1) =
w1(s1w2−s2w1)
2s1∆s
+ t1, where ∆s ≡
s2 − s1.
Stage 2. The monopolist simultaneously bargains over the two-part tariff with the two
producers.2 The bargaining weights are unchanged compared to the case of exclusive
contracts, and they are common knowledge among the firms. The outside options for
the upstream firms are still zero: if no agreement is reached they cannot sell their good.
Yet, in this case, the outside option for the monopolist is no longer zero, because, if
the agreement with firm i is not reached, the bargaining with firm j (i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6=
j) continues, as in the case of exclusive contracts. Thus, the outside option of the
monopolist in the bargaining with firm 1 is ΠI2 and that with firm 2 is Π
I
1. Accordingly,
the two Nash products are
B1(w1, w2, t1, t2) = [Π(w1, w2, t1, t2)− αs2
4
]β[pi1(w1, w2, t1)]
1−β, (4)
B2(w1, w2, t1, t2) = [Π(w1, w2, t1, t2)− βs1
4
]α[pi2(w1, w2, t2)]
1−α. (5)
The joint maximization of (4) and (5) yields the equilibrium two-part tariffs with
non-exclusive contracts. They are wII1 = 0, t
II
1 =
s1β(1−α)(1−β)
4(α+β−αβ) and w
II
2 = 0, t
II
2 =
2The analysis is developed in the case of public contracts. However, since the monopolist knows
the terms of both contracts, the distinction between public and secret contracts is immaterial here.
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(1−α)[αs2−βs1+(1−α)βs2]
4(α+β−αβ) .
3 By plugging these values back into the equilibrium prices and
demands we obtain
pII2 =
s2
2
, pII1 =
s1
2
, (6)
DII2 =
1
2
, DII1 = 0. (7)
Since wIIi = 0, i ∈ {1, 2}, the profits of the upstream firms coincide with the fixed fee
of the two-part tariff: piIIi = t
II
i , i ∈ {1, 2}. The profit of the downstream monopolist is
ΠII =
αs2
4
+
s1β
2 (1− α)
4(α + β − αβ) . (8)
We state
Proposition 1. Let (α, β) ∈]0, 1[2. The monopolist
(i) Always signs contracts with both the high- and low-quality producer.
(ii) Never sells the low-quality good.
Proof. ∀(α, β) ∈]0, 1[2
(i) ΠII − ΠI1 = αs24 − αβs14(α+β−αβ) > 0; ΠII − ΠI2 = s1(1−α)β
2
4(α+β−αβ) > 0.
(ii) DII1 = 0
The monopolist always finds it optimal to sign non-exclusive contracts with both
producers. These contracts are efficient, as the upstream price equals the upstream
marginal production cost. Yet, the monopolist sets the downstream prices so that the
equilibrium demand for the low-quality good is zero, to avoid cannibalization between
variants. The monopolist nevertheless pays a positive fee, as determined by the contract,
to the low-quality producer. The contractual relationship with the low-quality producer
is only a device to improve the bargaining position of the monopolist over the high-
quality producer, and has no effect on the final market.
3Proof in Appendix A.
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4 Discussion
Our result connects to several strands of literature. First, it shows that the “pooling
menu” (Acharyya, 1998) remains an equilibrium outcome when vertical relations and
non-linear contracts are taken into account, because of the monopolist’s endeavor to
avoid cannibalization between variants. Yet the monopolist “subsidizes” the low-quality
firm in order to have a “call option” for the low-quality good which is never taken up
along the equilibrium path. This observation allows us to link our note to the literature
on private labels. Mills (1995), analyzing successive monopolies with linear contracts,
shows that private labels purchased in competitive markets may be used by retailers to
increase their “bargaining power” over suppliers. Yet, depending on the relative unit
prices of the (high-quality) national brand and of the (low-quality) private label, and
on their quality differential, the retailer may actually sell the low-quality good. This
should be contrasted with our result, which states that the monopolist never offers the
low-quality good to consumers, even though it signs a contract with the low-quality
producer. The reason is that, unlike Mills (1995), we consider non-linear contracts
which do not distort the relative upstream price of products. This ultimately makes it
is unprofitable for the monopolist to actually sell the low-quality good along with the
high-quality one. Finally, our note relates to the analyses of the monopoly incentives
towards product innovation. Lambertini and Orsini (2000) and Gabszewicz and Wauthy
(2002) show that, in the absence of spillover effects, the monopolist’s product innovation
incentives are socially suboptimal. Our note, by contrast, suggests that a monopolist
may have too many product innovation incentives. Assume,that only the high-quality
good is available from an upstream producer, the monopolist may still decide to develop
a low-quality variant of the good in order to improve its bargaining position relative to
the supplier. Since the low-quality variant would not ever be sold on the final market,
neither it would affect the pricing policy of the monopolist, any investment to develop
this variety would have no positive impact on industy surplus and, accordingly, would
be socially undesirable.
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Appendices
A Optimal two-part tariffs with non-exclusive con-
tracts
Consider first the maximization of (4) and (5) with respect to ti. By solving
∂ log[B1(·)]
∂t1
=
0 and ∂ log[B2(·)]
∂t2
= 0 for t1 and t2 we obtain, respectively:
t1(w1, w2, t2) =
=
(1−α)(1−β)s22s1+s2[s21(α+β−αβ−1)−2(1−β)s1w2+(1+β)w21]+s1w2[2s1+w2−2w1−β(2s1+w2)]
4s1(s2−s1) +
− (1− β)t2, (9)
t2(w1, w2, t1) =
=
s1s22(1−α)+s2[(1−α)w21−2s1w2−(1−α)(1+β)s21]−(α−1)βs31+s1w2(2s1+αw2+w2−2w1)
4s1(s2−s1) +
− (1− α)t1. (10)
We now use (9) (res. (10)) as a constraint in the problem of maximizing B1(·) (res.
B2(·)) with respect to w1 (res. w2). The solution to these programs is:
wII1 = 0, w
II
2 = 0. (11)
By plugging (11) into (9) and (10) and solving the system so defined we obtain the
optimal fixed fees:
tII1 =
s1β(1−α)(1−β)
4(α+β−αβ) , t
II
2 =
(1−α)[αs2−βs1+(1−α)βs2]
4(α+β−αβ) . (12)
Second-order conditions are locally satisfied. This, together with the uniqueness of the
maximizers of Bi(·), i ∈ {1, 2}, completes the proof.
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